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1Joint Information and Jamming Beamforming
for Secrecy Rate Maximization in
Cognitive Radio Networks
Van-Dinh Nguyen, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, Octavia A. Dobre, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Oh-Soon Shin, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we consider the secure beamforming
design for an underlay cognitive radio multiple-input single-
output broadcast channel in the presence of multiple passive
eavesdroppers. Our goal is to design a jamming noise (JN)
transmit strategy to maximize the secrecy rate of the secondary
system. By utilizing the zero-forcing method to eliminate the
interference caused by JN to the secondary user, we study the
joint optimization of the information and JN beamforming for
secrecy rate maximization of the secondary system while satisfy-
ing all the interference power constraints at the primary users,
as well as the per-antenna power constraint at the secondary
transmitter. For an optimal beamforming design, the original
problem is a nonconvex program, which can be reformulated
as a convex program by applying the rank relaxation method.
To this end, we prove that the rank relaxation is tight and
propose a barrier interior-point method to solve the resulting
saddle point problem based on a duality result. To find the
global optimal solution, we transform the considered problem
into an unconstrained optimization problem. We then employ
Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method to solve the
resulting unconstrained problem which helps reduce the complex-
ity significantly, compared to conventional methods. Simulation
results show the fast convergence of the proposed algorithm and
substantial performance improvements over existing approaches.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, interference, jamming noise,
physical layer security, zero-forcing, transmit beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer (PHY)-security has been considered as a
promising technique to prevent eavesdropping without upper
layer data encryption. The key aim of PHY-security is to
guarantee a positive secrecy rate of the legitimate user by
exploiting random characteristics of the wireless channel [2],
[3]. To make PHY-security viable, the quality of the legitimate
channel is required to be better than the eavesdroppers’
[4]. However, this assumption may not be always feasible
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in practice. Traditionally, one possible way to improve the
secrecy rate is to use multiple antennas at the transmitter
for designing beamforming vectors [5]–[7]. This technique
allows the concentration of the transmit signal over the in-
tended user’s direction while reducing power leakage to the
eavesdroppers. Furthermore, the transmitter tries to debilitate
the desired signal at the eavesdroppers.
Recently, another promising technique has been proposed
to embed jamming noise (JN), also known as artificial noise,
at the transmitter, which is transmitted simultaneously with
its own information signal to degrade the channel of the
eavesdropper. Notably, [8] first introduced the transmitter that
spends some of the available power to produce the JN for
the purpose of degrading the channel to eavesdroppers. The
use of JN for beamforming design can be divided into two
major categories, depending on how much the transmitter
knows the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper,
e.g., with passive and active eavesdroppers. In [9], a passive
eavesdropper case was considered where the JN is designed to
null out the interference to the legitimate user. Inspired by the
work in [9], the authors in [10]–[13] analyzed and optimized
the secrecy performance of the systems. The common design
of those works is to force JN beamforming into the null space
of the legitimate channel, whereas the beamforming for trans-
mitting information is fixed to maximum-ratio-transmission
(MRT). For the case of active eavesdroppers, the secrecy
rate maximization problem for multiple-input single-output
(MISO) channel overheard by multiple eavesdroppers was
considered in [14], [15], where the rank relaxation is proved to
be tight by applying a semidefinite program (SDP) relaxation.
In addition, the imperfect knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
CSI at the legitimate transmitter was presented as an emerging
subject in different works, e.g., related to the outage robust
design [16] and the worst-case robust transmit design [17],
[18].
Moreover, similarly to other wireless networks, cognitive
radio networks (CRNs) are particularly faced with security
threats due to the openness of wireless transmission media.
Although security is a critical issue, PHY-security of CRNs
has not been well studied until recently. Several efforts of
PHY-security in CRNs have been reported in [5], [19]–[22].
In [19], by considering a secondary transmitter equipped with
multiple antennas, the authors designed a beamforming vector
to maximize the secrecy capacity of the secondary system,
as well as to help the primary system improve the secrecy
2capacity. A cooperative communication between the secondary
and primary systems was studied in [20] to improve the
secrecy capacity of the primary system while satisfying the
quality of service (QoS) of the secondary system. The optimal
robust design problem for secure MISO CRNs, where the
secondary transmitter does not have perfect CSI of all the
channels but only knows the uncertainty regions containing
the actual channels, was addressed in [21]. Furthermore, the
primary transmitter with a jamming beamforming that avoids
interference to the primary receiver was investigated in [22],
where a closed-form expression of the achievable rate was
derived. Most of the prior research on beamforming design
for CRNs assumed either a single primary receiver or a
single eavesdropper. In addition, the CSI of the eavesdropper’s
channel was assumed to be perfectly known at the transmitter.
However, those assumptions are not practical, particularly
when the eavesdroppers are passive devices.
To overcome these limitations of the previous works, in
this paper we consider the case where multiple eavesdroppers
wiretap the confidential messages from the secondary system
in the presence of multiple primary users. Different from the
works in [5], [19]–[21], we investigate the scenario where
the CSI of the eavesdroppers’ channels is partially known
[9], [22], in the statistical sense. It is important to note
that the results in [9], [22] cannot be directly applied to
our scenario since the transmit and JN beamformings are
fixed and mainly focus on power allocation. In addition, the
beamforming design of the works in [9], [22] may not be
efficient for an underlay CRN, where the interferences to the
primary users caused by the secondary system cannot exceed
a certain threshold. For the present problem, we consider
the joint optimization of information and JN beamforming
to maximize the secrecy rate subject to per-antenna power
constraints (PAPCs) at the secondary transmitter and the in-
terference power constraint at the primary users. The problem
of interest differs from the ones studied previously, which
often assumed a sum power constraint. In many existing
approaches, the beamforming designs for information and JN
are not simultaneously optimized. In this paper we adopt the
zero-forcing method at the secondary transmitter to eliminate
the interference caused by JN to the secondary user, for its
simplicity and effectiveness. To facilitate the maximization
of the secrecy rate, we introduce an auxiliary variable to
control the level of mutual information from the secondary
transmitter to eavesdroppers. For an optimal solution, the
beamforming design problem can be cast as an SDP by
showing that the rank relaxation is tight as in [14], [15], [19],
which can be solved by generic conic solvers such as SDPT3
[30] and SeDuMi [31]. However, we do not follow such an
approach for the following two reasons. First, it provides few
useful insights into the structure of the optimal beamforming
design. Second, its computational complexity is generally very
high when the problem size becomes large for a real-time
implementation, and it has no explicit form, thus hindering
any further theoretical analysis.
In this paper, we propose an efficient algorithm for the opti-
mization problem by first transforming the constraint resulting
from the statistical information of the passive eavesdroppers
into a linear matrix inequality and convex constraint, and
prove the optimality of the rank relaxation. By extending
a duality result, we convert the considered problem into a
minimax program with an equality constraint, for which a
barrier method is derived to find a saddle point. The proposed
algorithm is an iterative Newton method which exploits the
special features of the design problem. In particular, in each
iteration to find the Newton step, we apply a block elimination
method to derive a system of generalized Sylvester equations;
this requires a reduced complexity compared to a generic
method based on solving a system of linear equations. To find
a global optimal solution, we design an optimization problem
via the dual problem associated with the algorithm of quasi-
Newton optimization, referred to as the Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm. In fact, the BFGS method
is an approximation of the Newton method for solving non-
linear problems, and often exhibits a superior convergence rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model and the formulation of the secrecy rate maximization
problem are described in Section II. In Section III, we derive
the optimization problem for the beamforming design. In
Section IV we present the proposed algorithms to solve this
problem. Numerical results are provided in Section V, and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
In this section, after introducing the notation used in this pa-
per, we present a CRN model for secure communication with
concurrent wireless information and jamming noise transfer.
A. Notation
Bold lower and upper case letters represent vectors and
matrices, respectively. XH , XT , tr(X), and rank(X) are the
Hermitian transpose, normal transpose, trace, and rank of a
matrix X, respectively. ‖ · ‖ and | · | denote the Euclidean
norm of a matrix or vector and the absolute value of a
complex scalar, respectively. IN represents an N ×N identity
matrix. [x]i is the i-th entry of vector x. [X]i,j is the entry
at the i-th row and j-th column of X. en is the n-th unit
vector, i.e., [en]n = 1 and [en]i = 0, ∀i 6= n. diag(x),
where x is a vector, denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal
elements of x. x ∼ CN (η,Z) indicates that x is a random
vector following a complex circularly symmetric Gaussian
distribution with mean vector η and covariance matrix Z. The
notation X  0 represents a positive semidefinite matrix X.
HN denotes the set of N × N complex Hermitian matrices.
λmax(X) and λj(X) denote the maximum eigenvalue and
the j-th eigenvalue of a Hermitian matrix X, respectively.
∇xf(x) represents the gradient of f(·) with respect to vector
x. The acronyms inf and sup denote the terms of infimum
and supremum, respectively.
B. Signal Model
We consider the PHY-security of a CRN consisting of
one secondary transmitter (ST), one secondary receiver (SU),
M primary users (PUs), and K eavesdroppers (Eves), as
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Fig. 1. A CRN model with multiple eavesdroppers.
illustrated in Fig. 1. The ST is equipped with N antennas,
while the other nodes are equipped with a single antenna.
In the secondary system, Eves intend to wiretap and decode
confidential messages from the ST. All the channels are
assumed to remain constant during a transmission block and
change independently from one block to another.
The main objective of the design is to maximize the secrecy
rate of the SU while satisfying a given interference power
constraint Im at the m-th PU, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . We
aim to design two beamforming vectors w and u at the ST,
corresponding to the data and the jamming noise as
xs = wsc + u (1)
where sc ∈ C is the confidential message that the ST transmits
to SU, with E{|sc|2} = 1, which is weighted with the beam-
forming vector w ∈ CN×1, and u is the jamming noise vector
whose elements are zero-mean complex Gaussian random
variables with covariance matrix U, i.e., u ∼ CN (0,U),
where U ∈ HN and U  0.
The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the SU
and at the k-th Eve are, respectively, given by
Γs =
|hHw|2
hHUh + 1
and Γk =
|gHk w|2
gHk Ugk + 1
, ∀k ∈ K (2)
where h ∈ CN×1 and gk ∈ CN×1 are the baseband equivalent
channels of the links from the ST to SU and to the k-th Eve,
respectively. K is defined as K , {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Without loss
of generality, the background thermal noise at each receiver
is assumed to be a zero-mean and unit variance complex
Gaussian random variable.
C. Problem Formulation
The secrecy rate of the SU, Rs, is defined as [24]
Rs = max
(
log(1 + Γs)−max
k∈K
log(1 + Γk), 0
)
. (3)
If Rs is kept larger than zero while ensuring that the received
interference at the m-th PU is below the predetermined thresh-
old Im, then the signal transmitted from the ST to the SU is
“undecodable,” as indicated in [25].
In this paper, the beamformer for the jamming noise is
designed to null out the interference to SU, such that
ΦHh = 0 (4)
where we choose U = ΦΦH with Φ ∈ CN×(N−1) [9], [22].
Thus, the SINR of SU and the k-th Eve can be rewritten as
Γs = |hHw|2 and Γk = |g
H
k w|2
‖gHk Φ‖2 + 1
, ∀k ∈ K. (5)
Remark 1: The assumption of null space jamming noise in
(4) is reasonable, since the use of jamming noise is intended
to degrade the channel of eavesdroppers, but not the legitimate
user [9], [22]. Importantly, the use of the null space jamming
noise constraint may simplify the design and analysis [16],
[17].
The optimization problem can be formulated as
P1 : max
w,Φ
{
log(1 + Γs)−max
k∈K
log(1 + Γk)
}
(6a)
s. t. ΦHh = 0 (6b)
[wwH ]n,n + [ΦΦ
H ]n,n ≤ Pn, ∀n ∈ N (6c)
|fHmw|2 + ‖fHmΦ‖2 ≤ Im, ∀m ∈M (6d)
where N , {1, 2, . . . , N} and M , {1, 2, . . . ,M}. fm ∈
CN×1 is the baseband equivalent channel of the link from the
ST to the m-th PU. The constraint in (6c) represents the power
constraint for the n-th antenna at the ST. We note that each
antenna is often equipped with its own power amplifier (PA).
Thus, one may need to limit the per-antenna peak power to
operate within the linear region of the PA [26]. The PAPCs
in (6c) are different from the sum power constraint (SPC)
considered in [15], [20]; however, the proposed beamforming
scheme in this paper can also be applied to the SPC with
slight modifications. The constraint in (6d) is to protect the
primary system, so that the interference power at the m-th PU
due to the ST is less than a given interference threshold Im,
∀m ∈M.
By introducing an auxiliary variable Γtol and in the spirit
of [27], P1 has the same optimal solutions as the following
new problem
P2 : max
w,Φ,Γtol>0
log(1 + |hHw|2)− log(1 + Γtol) (7a)
s. t.max
k∈K
|gHk w|2
‖gHk Φ‖2 + 1
≤ Γtol (7b)
(6b), (6c), (6d) (7c)
where Γtol > 0 is the maximum allowable SINR for Eves to
wiretap the confidential messages from the ST. Intuitively, we
have an equivalent problem with less difficulty by adjusting
Γtol.
To further simplify P2, let V¯ ∈ CN×(N−1) be the null
space of hH . Then we can write Φ = V¯Φ¯, where Φ¯ ∈
4C(N−1)×(N−1) is the solution to the following problem
P3 : max
w, Φ¯,Γtol>0
log(1 + |hHw|2)− log(1 + Γtol) (8a)
s. t.max
k∈K
|gHk w|2
gHk V¯Φ¯Φ¯
H
V¯Hgk + 1
≤ Γtol (8b)
[wwH ]n,n + [V¯Φ¯Φ¯
H
V¯H ]n,n ≤ Pn, ∀n ∈ N (8c)
|fHmw|2 + ‖fHm V¯Φ¯‖2 ≤ Im, ∀m ∈M. (8d)
D. Channel State Information
We consider the case that the CSI of h and fm, ∀m, is
perfectly known at the ST [5], [19], [20], where the SU and
PUs are active users. Explicitly, the ST sends pilot signals
at the beginning of each scheduling slot to the SU and PUs.
The channel vectors are estimated at the SU and PUs and
then fed back to the ST using a dedicated control channel.
In this paper, we assume that Eves passively wiretap the
confidential messages transmitted from the ST to SU without
causing any interference to the SU and PUs. For the passive
Eves, the entries of gk, ∀k, are modeled as independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading channels, where
the instantaneous information of these wiretap channels are
not available at ST. These assumptions about the passive Eves
are commonly used in the literature [9], [22], [23]. Based on
the above settings, P3 can be rewritten as
P4 : max
w, Φ¯,Γtol>0
log(1 + |hHw|2)− log(1 + Γtol) (9a)
s. t. Pr
(
max
k∈K
wHGkw
tr(GkV¯Φ¯Φ¯
H
V¯H) + 1
≤ Γtol
)
≥ κ (9b)
[wwH ]n,n + [V¯Φ¯Φ¯
H
V¯H ]n,n ≤ Pn, ∀n ∈ N (9c)
|fHmw|2 + ‖fHm V¯Φ¯‖2 ≤ Im, ∀m ∈M. (9d)
where Gk , gkgHk , and κ is a parameter for providing secure
communication. In particular, the maximum received SINR at
all Eves is required to be less than a given value Γtol with at
least probability κ [23].
III. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM DESIGN
The global optimal Γtol of P4 can be found from one
dimensional search. Therefore, our main task in this section is
to derive a convex optimization approach to P4 with respect
to w and Φ¯ for a fixed value of Γtol. A method to find the
optimal solution of Γtol will be presented in the next section.
We note that P4 is not a convex program. A standard way to
solve (9) for a fixed Γtol is to consider the following problem
P5 : max
W0, U¯0
log(1 + hHWh) (10a)
s. t.Pr
(
max
k∈K
tr(GkW)
tr(GkV¯U¯V¯H) + 1
≤ Γtol
)
≥ κ (10b)
[W]n,n + [V¯U¯V¯
H ]n,n ≤ Pn, ∀n ∈ N (10c)
tr(FmW) + tr(F¯mU¯) ≤ Im, ∀m ∈M (10d)
rank(W) = 1 (10e)
where W , wwH , U¯ , Φ¯Φ¯H , Fm , fmfHm , F¯m , f¯mf¯Hm ,
and f¯m , V¯Hfm. In addition, we have dropped log(1 + Γtol)
from the objective function in (10) to have a simpler problem
without affecting optimality. We remark that the constraint
rank(W) = 1 must be satisfied to transmit the confidential
message sc ∈ C. P5 is still a nonconvex program due to the
nonconvex constraints in (10b) and (10e).
To make P5 a tractable problem, we first transform the
constraint in (10b) into a linear matrix inequality and convex
constraint according to the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The constraint in (10b) can be transformed as
W − ΓtolV¯U¯V¯H  Iξ (11)
where ξ = Φ−1N (1−κ1/K)Γtol, with Φ−1N (·) being the inverse
cumulative distribution function of an inverse central chi-
square random variable with 2N degrees of freedom.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2: Note that the implication in (11) can be applied
to any continuous channel distribution by replacing Φ−1N (·)
with the corresponding one. Consequently, the proposed so-
lution introduced in this paper also applies to other eaves-
droppers’ channel distributions with slight modification of the
optimization problem.
By replacing (10b) with (11), we obtain the following new
problem
P6 : max
W,U¯
log(1 + hHWh) (12a)
s. t.W − ΓtolV¯U¯V¯H  Iξ (12b)
[W]n,n + [V¯U¯V¯
H ]n,n ≤ Pn, ∀n ∈ N (12c)
tr(FmW) + tr(F¯mU¯) ≤ Im, ∀m ∈M (12d)
W  0, U¯  0, rank(W) = 1. (12e)
We note that the feasible solutions of (12) also satisfy (10) but
not vice versa due to the inequality in (59). In other words, (11)
is a relaxation of (10b) which yields a large feasible solution
set for P5. Although (12) is a nonconvex program, it can be
efficiently solved with some numerical solvers by dropping
the rank constraint in (12e); then, the considered problem P6
becomes a so-called rank relaxed problem. Importantly, we
prove that the rank relaxation is tight in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The optimal solution W? to (12) satisfies
rank(W?) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3: We note that the optimization problem with a
fixed Γtol in (12) is also applicable for the SINR-based design
in [19], [23]. More challengingly, the goal of this paper is to
provide a secrecy rate maximization for the secondary system,
rather than a certain quality-of-service.
The problem P6 now is a convex SDP, which can be solved
by numerical solvers such as SDPT3 [30] and SeDuMi [31].
However, solving (12) directly may not be efficient since W
is treated as a Hermitian matrix of N2 real variables, which
is of relatively high complexity especially when N becomes
large. As mentioned earlier, such a method is not considered
in this paper. We now present the following theorem.
5Theorem 1: Consider the following minimax problem
P7 : min
ψ≥0,D0
max
w≥0,U¯0
log |Σ+hwh
H |
|Σ|
s. t. w + tr(ΩU¯) ≤ P
ξtr(D) + pTψ ≤ P
(13)
where Σ = D + diag(λ) +
∑M
m=1 µmFm, Ω =
V¯H
(
−ΓtolD + diag(λ) +
∑M
m=1 µmFm
)
V¯, and ψ =
[λT µT ]T . Then, the optimal solution W? of the relaxed
problem (12) can be obtained from that of (13) as
W =
Σ−1hwhHΣ−1
hHΣ−1h
. (14)
Proof: See Appendix C.
We remark that the problem in (13) is equivalent to (12),
and the inequality constraints in (13) hold with equality at
optimality. We now provide a sketch of the proof to verify this
point. Suppose w + tr(ΩU¯) < P for a fixed (ψ, D), there
possibly exists an arbitrarily small value  > 0 that satisfies
w++tr(ΩU¯) < P . Replacing w by w+/2 in the objective
function in (13) yields a larger objective value, which leads
to contradiction since w is optimal. A similar observation can
be made in the constraint ξtr(D) + pTψ ≤ P for a fixed
(w, U¯). Thus, (13) can be efficiently solved by the interior-
point methods in [33] since the equality constraints are easy to
handle in general. Interestingly, solving (13) for the optimal
solution of w ∈ C requires much lower complexity, when
compared with solving W ∈ CN×N . We propose a numerical
algorithm to solve (13) based on interior-point methods in the
next section.
Remark 4: As mentioned in Section II-C, we now show
how P7 can be modified to include a SPC which is writ-
ten as tr(W + V¯U¯V¯H) ≤ P , where P is the total
transmit power at the ST. By following the same steps
as presented in Appendix C, we can arrive at a sim-
ilar minimax problem as shown in P7, where Σ, Ω,
and ψ are changed to Σ = D + λI +
∑M
m=1 µmFm,
Ω = V¯H
(
−ΓtolD + λI +
∑M
m=1 µmFm
)
V¯, and ψ =
[λ µT ]T , respectively, and λ ∈ C is the dual variable
associated with the SPC. Consequently, Algorithm 1 is rather
general in the sense that it can be applied to handle this
case as well. In addition, if we assume that the total transmit
power at the ST is the sum of all PAPCs, i.e., mathematically
P =
∑N
n=1 Pn, then it follows that R
SPC
s ≥ RPAPCss , where
RSPCs and R
PAPCs
s are the optimal values of (3) corresponding
to the SPC and PAPCs, respectively.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
A. Proposed Algorithm to Solve (13) with a fixed Γtol
For simplicity, we define U¯ = Ω−1/2U˙Ω−1/2 since Ω is
invertible and then the relationship between U and U˙ is given
by
U = V¯Ω−1/2U˙Ω−1/2V¯H . (15)
We now present a computationally efficient algorithm to solve
(13) to find the optimal solution for w and U˙. Toward this
end, we use the relationships in (14) and (15) to derive the
optimal beamformers of W and U. As mentioned earlier,
we consider the following problem rather than problem (13)
without affecting its optimality.
min
ψ≥0,D0
max
w≥0,U˙0
log |Σ+hwh
H |
|Σ|
s. t. w + tr(U˙) = P
ξtr(D) + pTψ = P.
(16)
The proposed method to solve (16) is based on a barrier
method to find a saddle point [33]. Accordingly, we consider
the modified objective function given by
f(t,ψ,D, w, U˙) = log
|Σ + hwhH |
|Σ| −
1
t
N+M∑
i=1
log(ψi)
− 1
t
log |D|+ 1
t
log(w) +
1
t
log |U˙| (17)
where log |U˙|, log |D|, log(ψi), and log(w) are the logarithmic
barrier functions to account for the constraints U˙  0,D 
0, ψi ≥ 0, and w ≥ 0, respectively, and t > 0 is a parameter
that controls the logarithm barrier terms. We should remark
that the modified objective function (17) is concave in (w, U˙)
for a fixed value of (ψ, D), and convex in (ψ, D) for a fixed
value of (w, U˙). For a given value of t, the barrier method
requires to solve a standard equality constrained maximization
problem
min
ψ≥0,D0
max
w≥0,U˙0
f(t,ψ,D, w, U˙) (18a)
s. t. w + tr(U˙) = P (18b)
ξtr(D) + pTψ = P. (18c)
The main idea of the interior-point method used to solve
(18) is summarized as follows: we find the optimal solution
(ψ,D, w, U˙) for a fixed value t (which is referred to as
a centering step), and increase t until the dual gap of the
equality constrained maximization problem (18) satisfies a
given accuracy. To do this, we start with the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions for (18), which are given by
hH(Σ + hwhH)−1h +
1
t
w−1 − η1 = 0. (19a)
1
t
U˙−1 − η1I = 0. (19b)
w + tr(U˙) = P. (19c)
eHn
[
(Σ + hwhH)−1 −Σ−1] en
−λ
−1
n
t
+ η2Pn = 0,∀n. (19d)
fHm
[
(Σ + hwhH)−1 −Σ−1] fm
−µ
−1
m
t
+ η2Im = 0,∀m.(19e)
(Σ + hwhH)−1 −Σ−1 − 1
t
D−1 + η2ξI = 0. (19f)
ξtr(D) + pTψ = P. (19g)
where η1 and η2 are the dual variables corresponding to the
constraints in (18b) and (18c), respectively. The results in
(19a), (19b), (19d), (19e), and (19f) are obtained by utilizing
6the gradient of the Lagrangian function with respect to w, U˙,
λ, η, and D, respectively.
Toward this end, we use the infeasible start Newton method
to find the optimal solution of (19). The aim of the Newton
method is to calculate a Newton step in each iteration. Specifi-
cally, we replace w by w+∆w, U˙ by U˙+∆U˙, λ by λ+∆λ,
µ by µ+∆µ, D by D+∆D, and ηi by ηi+∆ηi, i ∈ {1, 2},
in (19a) to have
thH(Σ + hwhH + ∆Σ + h∆whH)−1h
+(w + ∆w)−1 − t(η1 + ∆η1) = 0 (20)
where ∆Σ = ∆D+diag(∆λ)+
∑M
m=1 ∆µmFm. By applying
the identity (A + B)−1 ≈ A−1 −A−1BA−1 for small B,1
(20) can be approximated as
thHΞ∆ΣΞhw2 + thHΞh∆whHΞhw2 + ∆w
+tw2∆η1 = twh
HΞhw + w − tw2η1 (21)
where Ξ , (Σ + hwhH)−1. Note that
hHΞ∆ΣΞh = hHΞ∆DΞh +
N∑
n=1
∆λnh
HΞene
H
n Ξh
+
M∑
m=1
∆µmh
HΞFmΞh. (22)
Substituting (22) into (21), we arrive at
thHΞ∆DΞhw2 + t
N∑
n=1
∆λnh
HΞene
H
n Ξhw
2
+ t
M∑
m=1
∆µmh
HΞFmΞhw
2 + thHΞh∆whHΞhw2
+ ∆w + tw2∆η1 = twh
HΞhw + w − tw2η1. (23)
Next, from (19d), (19e), and (19f), we have
teHn
[
(Σ + hwhH + ∆Σ + h∆whH)−1 − (Σ + ∆Σ)−1] en
−(λn + ∆λn)−1 + t(η2 + ∆η2)Pn = 0, ∀n. (24)
tfHm
[
(Σ + hwhH + ∆Σ + h∆whH)−1 − (Σ + ∆Σ)−1] fm
−(µm + ∆µm)−1 + t(η2 + ∆η2)Im = 0, ∀m. (25)
t(Σ + hwhH + ∆Σ + h∆whH)−1 − t(Σ + ∆Σ)−1
−(D + ∆D)−1 + t(η2 + ∆η2)ξI = 0. (26)
Following the same steps from (21) to (23), (24) can be
approximated as
teHn Ξ∆DΞen − teHn Σ−1∆DΣ−1en + t
N∑
i=1
∆λiϕn,i
+ t
M∑
m=1
∆µmϕn,m + t∆wφn −∆λnλ−2n − t∆η2Pn
= tϕn − λ−1n + tη2Pn, ∀n (27)
1The approximation (A + B)−1 ≈ A−1 − A−1BA−1 is proper for
small entries of matrix B and relatively rough for large entries of matrix B
[34, Chapter 3]. In particular, the residual error, as shown in Fig. 2, is high
for the first iterations since the approximation is not reliable. However, when
Algorithm 1 reaches the optimal solution due to updating B in each iteration,
the residual error will be small and thus the approximation becomes very
accurate.
where ϕn,i , |eHn Ξei|2 − |eHn Σ−1ei|2, ϕn,m , |eHn Ξfm|2 −
|eHn Σ−1fm|2, φn , |eHn Ξh|2, and ϕn , eHn [Ξ−Σ−1]en.
Similarly, (25) is approximated as
tfHmΞ∆DΞfm − tfHmΣ−1∆DΣ−1fm + t
N∑
j=1
∆λjϑm,j
+ t
M∑
s=1
∆µsϑm,s + t∆wαm −∆µmµ−2m
− t∆η2Im = tϑm − µ−1m + tη2Im, ∀m (28)
where ϑm,j , |fHmΞej |2 − |fHmΣ−1ej |2, ϑm,s , |fHmΞfs|2 −
|fHmΣ−1fs|2, αm , |fHmΞh|2, and ϑm , fHm [Ξ−Σ−1]fm.
Similarly, we can approximate (26) as
tDΞ∆DΞD− tDΣ−1∆DΣ−1D + t
N∑
n=1
∆λnDΞ˙nD
+ t
M∑
m=1
∆µmDΞˆmD + t∆wDΞ¯D−∆D− t∆η2ξD2
= tD[Ξ−Σ−1]D−D + tη2ξD2 (29)
where Ξ˙n , ΞeneHn Ξ − Σ−1eneHn Σ−1, Ξˆm , ΞFmΞ −
Σ−1FmΣ−1, and Ξ¯ , ΞhhHΞ. Finally, from (19b), (19c),
and (19g), we have
∆U˙ + t∆η1U˙
2 = U˙− tη1U˙2 (30)
∆w + tr(∆U˙) = P − w − tr(U˙) (31)
ξtr(∆D) + pT∆ψ = P − ξtr(D)− pTψ. (32)
At each Newton step, we can transform (23), (27), (28),
(29), (30), (31), and (32) into a system of linear equations
(i.e., vectorize D and U˙ as a vector of length N(N+1)/2 and
N(N − 1)/2, respectively) to find the optimization variables.
However, such a generic method using elimination requires
complexity of O(N6). In what follows, we apply a block elim-
ination method to find the optimal primal and dual variables
which results a low-complexity [33] as
∆U˙ = Ψ(0) + ∆η1Ψ
(1). (33)
∆D = Θ(0) +
N∑
n=1
∆λnΘ
(n) +
M∑
m=1
∆µmΘ
(N+m)
+∆wΘ(N+M+1) + ∆η2Θ
(N+M+2). (34)
Substituting (33) into (30), we have
Ψ(0) = U˙− tη1U˙2
Ψ(1) = −tU˙2. (35)
The complexity of computing the multiplication of two ma-
trices in (35) is of the order O((N − 1)3). By doing so, we
substitute (34) into (29) yielding a system of (N + M + 3)
7generalized Sylvester equations
tDΣ−1Θ(0)Σ−1D− tDΞΘ(0)ΞD + Θ(0)
= −tD[Ξ−Σ−1 + η2ξI]D + D
tDΣ−1Θ(n)Σ−1D− tDΞΘ(n)ΞD + Θ(n)
= tDΞ˙nD, ∀n
tDΣ−1Θ(N+m)Σ−1D− tDΞΘ(N+m)ΞD
+Θ(N+m) = tDΞˆmD, ∀m (36)
tDΣ−1Θ(N+M+1)Σ−1D− tDΞΘ(N+M+1)ΞD
+Θ(N+M+1) = tDΞ¯D
tDΣ−1Θ(N+M+2)Σ−1D− tDΞΘ(N+M+2)ΞD
+Θ(N+M+2) = −tξD2.
The numerical methods to solve the generalized Sylvester
equations (36) with complexity O(N3) can be found in [35].
Thus, it can be said that the complexity of solving (35) and
(36) is much lower than that of solving a system of linear
equations by a generic method.
To calculate ∆w, {∆λn}, {∆µm}, and ∆ηi, i ∈ {1, 2}, at
each Newton step, we aim to stack (23), (27), (28), (31), and
(32) into a system of linear equations. To do this, we substitute
(34) into (23), which leads to
γw∆w +
N∑
n=1
γn∆λn +
M∑
m=1
γ˜m∆µm
+ tw2∆η1 + γη2∆η2 = γ0 (37)
where γw, γn, γm, γη2 , and γ0 are, respectively, given as
follows
γw = th
HΞΘ(N+M+1)Ξhw2 + thHΞhhHΞhw2 + 1
γn = th
HΞΘ(n)Ξhw2 + thHΞene
H
n Ξhw
2
γ˜m = th
HΞΘ(N+m)Ξhw2 + thHΞFmΞhw
2
γη2 = th
HΞΘ(N+M+2)Ξhw2
γ0 = th
HΞhw2 + w − tw2η1 − thHΞΘ(0)Ξhw2. (38)
Similarly to (37), (27) can then be rewritten as
φ˜n∆w +
N∑
i=1
ϕ˜n,i∆λi − λ−2n ∆λn
+
M∑
m=1
˜˜ϕn,m∆µm + θn∆η2 = ϕ˜n, ∀n (39)
where φ˜n, ϕ˜n,i, ˜˜ϕn,m, θn, and ϕ˜n are, respectively, defined by
φ˜n = te
H
n ΞΘ
(N+M+1)Ξen
− teHn Σ−1Θ(N+M+1)Σ−1en + tφn
ϕ˜n,i = te
H
n ΞΘ
(i)Ξen − teHn Σ−1Θ(i)Σ−1en
+ tϕn,i
˜˜ϕn,m = te
H
n ΞΘ
(N+m)Ξen
− teHn Σ−1Θ(N+m)Σ−1en + tϕn,m
θn = te
H
n ΞΘ
(N+M+2)Ξen
− teHn Σ−1Θ(N+M+2)Σ−1en − tPn
ϕ˜n = tϕn − λ−1n + tη2Pn
− teHn ΞΘ(0)Ξen + teHn Σ−1Θ(0)Σ−1en.
(40)
Next, (28) is reformulated as
α˜m∆w +
N∑
j=1
ϑ˜m,j∆λj +
M∑
s=1
˜˜
ϑm,s∆µs
−µ−2m ∆µm + θ˜m∆η2 = ϑ˜m, ∀m (41)
where α˜m, ϑ˜m,j ,
˜˜
ϑm,s, θ˜n, and ϑ˜m are, respectively, given as
α˜m = tf
H
mΞΘ
(N+M+1)Ξfm
− tfHmΣ−1Θ(N+M+1)Σ−1fm + tαm
ϑ˜m,j = tf
H
mΞΘ
(j)Ξfm − tfHmΣ−1Θ(j)Σ−1fm
+ tϑm,j
˜˜
ϑm,s = tf
H
mΞΘ
(N+s)Ξfm
− tfHmΣ−1Θ(N+s)Σ−1fm + tϑm,s
θ˜m = tf
H
mΞΘ
(N+M+2)Ξfm
− tfHmΣ−1Θ(N+M+2)Σ−1fm − tIm
ϑ˜m = tϑm − µ−1m + tη2PIm − tfHmΞΘ(0)Ξfm
+ tfHmΣ
−1Θ(0)Σ−1fm.
(42)
Finally, substituting (33) and (34) into (31) and (32), respec-
tively, yields
∆w + tr(Ψ(1))∆η1 = P − w − tr(U˙ + Ψ(0)) (43)
χw∆w +
N∑
n=1
χn∆λn +
M∑
m=1
χ˜m∆µm + χη2∆η2 = χ0 (44)
where χw = ξtr(Θ(N+M+1)), χn = ξtr(Θ(n)) + Pn, χ˜m =
ξtr(Θ(N+m)) + Im, χη2 = ξtr(Θ
(N+M+2)), and χ0 =
P − pTψ − ξtr(D + Θ(0)). Let us define ∆x ,
[∆w∆λT ∆µT ∆η1 ∆η2]
T . A system of linear equations can
be derived by stacking (37), (39), (41), (43), and (44) as
A∆x = b (45)
where b1 = γ0, bn+1 = ϕ˜n for n = 1, . . . , N , bN+1+m = ϑ˜m
for m = 1, . . . ,M , bN+M+2 = P − w − tr(U˙ + Ψ(0)), and
bN+M+3 = χ0. Next, the matrix A ∈ C(N+M+3)×(N+M+3)
is given at the top of the next page, where δi,j denotes the
Kronecker’s function, i.e., δi,j = 1 if i = j and δi,j = 0 if
i 6= j. We point out that the complexity of solving (45) (i.e.,
the inverse of matrix A) is of the order O((N + M + 1)3)
[33].
In order to apply the barrier method, we need to compute
the residual norm of w, U˙,D,λ,µ, and {ηi} used in the
8A =

γw · · · γn · · · γ˜m · · · tw2 γη2
...
...
...
...
...
φ˜n · · · ϕ˜n,i − λ−2n δn,i · · · ˜˜ϕn,m · · · 0 θn
...
...
...
...
...
α˜m · · · ϑ˜m,j · · · ˜˜ϑm,s − µ−2m δm,s · · · 0 θ˜m
...
...
...
...
...
1 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · tr(Ψ(1)) 0
χw · · · χn · · · χ˜m · · · 0 χη2

.
backtracking line search procedure which is defined as [29]
r(w, U˙,D,λ,µ, {ηi}) =
|hH(Σ + hwhH)−1h + 1
t
w−1 − η1|
+‖1
t
U˙−1 − η1I‖F + ‖(Σ + hwhH)−1
−Σ−1 − 1
t
D−1 + η2ξI‖F + ‖pi‖2 + ‖$‖2
+|P − w − tr(U˙)|+ |P − ξtr(D)− pTψ| (46)
where pi ∈ CN×1 and $ ∈ CM×1 are, respectively, defined
by
pin , eHn
[
(Σ + hwhH)−1 −Σ−1] en − 1
t
λ−1n + η2Pn, ∀n
$m , fHm
[
(Σ + hwhH)−1 −Σ−1] fm − 1
t
µ−1m + η2Im, ∀m.
The proposed numerical algorithm based on the barrier method
to solve (13) is summarized in Algorithm 1. The backtracking
line search procedure in line 12 stops when the residual norms
in (46) is less than a given accuracy, i.e., the tolerance .
B. Optimization over Γtol
P7 can be rewritten by considering the optimization over
Γtol as
max
Γtol>0
f(Γtol) (47)
where f(Γtol) is defined as
f(Γtol) =
min
ψ≥0,D0
max
w≥0,U¯0
log |Σ+hwh
H |
|Σ| − log(1 + Γtol)
s. t. w + tr(ΩU¯) = P
ξtr(D) + pTψ = P.
(48)
Since the objective function is concave with respect to Γtol,
a conventional method to find the optimal solution of Γtol
is based on one dimensional search [14]. However, the major
computational complexity comes from solving (48). Therefore,
one dimensional search method to seeking a saddle point
of Γtol may not be efficient since one dimensional search
often shows slow convergence. In this section, we propose an
efficient method to find the global optimal Γ?tol which greatly
reduces the complexity. To do this, we consider the following
Algorithm 1 The proposed numerical algorithm to solve (13)
Initinalization: w := 1, U˙ := IN−1,D := IN ,λ := 1,µ :=
1, {ηi} := 0, t := t0, and ` and tolerance  > 0
1: repeat {Outer iteration}
2: repeat {Inner iteration (centering step)}
3: Solve (35) to find Ψ(i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ 1.
4: Solve (36) to find Θ(i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ N +M + 2.
5: Solve (45) to find ∆w, ∆λ, ∆µ, and {∆ηi}.
6: Backtracking line search on r(w, U˙,D,λ,µ, {ηi}):
7: s = 1
8: while r
(
w + s∆w, U˙ + s∆U˙,D + s∆D,λ +
s∆λ,µ + s∆µ, {ηi} + s{∆ηi}
)
> (1 −
αs)r
(
w, U˙,D,λ,µ, {ηi}
)
or U˙ + s∆U˙  0 and
D + s∆D  0 do
9: s = βs
10: end while
11: Update primal and dual variables: w := w + s∆w,
U˙ := U˙ + s∆U˙; D := D + s∆D, λ := λ + s∆λ,
µ := µ+ s∆µ, and {ηi} := {ηi}+ s{∆ηi}.
12: until r(w, U˙,D,λ,µ, {ηi}) < 
13: Increase t: t = `t.
14: until t is sufficiently large to tolerate the duality gap.
equivalent problem for a given set of (w, U˙,D,λ, µ)
min
Γtol>0
h(Γtol) , log(1 + Γtol)
s. t. −tr(V¯HDV¯U¯)Γtol = P − w − tr(Ω˜U¯)
ξ˜tr(D)Γtol = P − pTψ
(49)
where Ω˜ , V¯H
(
diag(λ) +
∑M
m=1 µmFm
)
V¯ and ξ˜ ,
Φ−1N (1 − κ1/K). With implicit constraint Γtol > 0, we can
derive the simpler form of the objective function in (49)
without affecting optimality, as follows:
h˜(Γtol) , h(Γtol − 1) = log(Γtol). (50)
The Lagrangian function of (49) can be defined as [33]
L(Γtol,υ) = h˜(Γtol) + υTaΓtol − ρTυ (51)
where ρ , [P − w − tr(Ω˜U¯) P − pTψ]T , a ,
[−tr(V¯HDV¯U¯), ξ˜tr(D)]T , and υ , [υ1 υ2]T with υ1
and υ2 being the dual variables related to the constraints in
(49). Then, the solution of (49) can be found by solving the
dual problem which is presented in the following theorem
9Theorem 2: The dual problem of (49) is given by
max
υ
g(υ) = −ρTυ − log(−aTυ)− 1 (52)
with implicit constraint aTυ < 0.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollary 1: The optimal solution Γtol can be obtained
from that of (52) as
Γtol = − 1
υTa
. (53)
Proof: Once the optimal dual variable υ? is found, we
can obtain the optimal solution of Γtol from (49) by solving
the KKT condition in (51) as
∇Γtol h˜(Γtol) + υTa = Γ−1tol + υTa = 0. (54)
This completes the proof.
We now apply Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm
[36] to solve the unconstrained optimization problem (52).
The BFGS method is a member of the quasi-Newton methods
which often shows superior convergence rate. A standard
method for solving the log concave function in (52) is to
consider the following equivalent optimization problem
min
υ
g˜(υ) = −g(υ). (55)
The BFGS algorithm can be described as
1. Compute ∆υ by ∆υ = −P∇g˜(υ),
where ∇υ g˜(υ) = ρ− a/(aTυ).
2. If ‖∇υ g˜(υ + ∆υ)‖ < ´ (tolerance), then stop.
3. Update the dual variables: υ := υ + ∆υ.
4. Compute φ´ = ∇υ g˜(υ + ∆υ)−∇υ g˜(υ).
5. Update P as [36]
P := P +
(
∆υT φ´+ (φ´)TPφ´
)(
∆υ∆υT
)
(∆υT φ´)2
− Pφ´∆υ
T + ∆υ(φ´)TP
∆υT φ´
. (56)
6. Go back to Step 1.
However, the cost of computation of these steps is rela-
tively high when the first gradient on υ is computed many
times. To reduce the computational complexity, we choose
φ = −∇g˜(υ) and store it for the next iteration. The overall
iterative algorithm based on the BFGS method, but customized
to our problem to solve (47) is given in Algorithm 2 and it
can be summarized as follows. For a given υ, Γtol in (53)
is computed, (48) (or equivalently (13)) is solved based on
Algorithm 1 to obtain (w, U˙,D,λ, µ); then update υ from
line 5 until ‖φ‖ is below a specified accuracy level (i.e., the
tolerance ´ ).
C. Complexity Comparison
The complexity of the proposed method mainly comes from
Algorithm 1. In particular, solving (35), (36), and (45) requires
a complexity of O((N − 1)3), O(N3), and O((N + M +
1)3), respectively, while a generic method has complexity
of O(N6). That is to say, the proposed algorithm requires
much less complexity, compared to the generic method. As
Algorithm 2 Main algorithm to solve (47)
Initinalization: υ := 1,φ := −∇υ g˜(υ), φ´ := 0,P := I ,
s´ := 1, and tolerance ´ > 0
1: loop
2: Solve (48) based on Algorithm 1 to obtain (w, U˙,D,λ,
µ).
3: Compute φ := φ− φ´ and ∆υ = Pφ.
4: Stop, if ‖φ‖ < ´.
5: Update υ, φ´, and P in the strict order:
υ := υ + s´∆υ
φ´ := φ+∇υ g˜(υ)
P as the result in (56).
6: end loop
7: Output: (υ, w, U˙,D,λ, µ)
mentioned in Section III, a semidefinite program (SDP) can
be applied to solve the relaxed problem of P6, i.e., using
a specific interior point method which is called the primal-
dual path following method [37]. However, such a method
has complexity of O((2N−1)4) per iteration, which is higher
than that of our proposed method, especially when N becomes
large.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate the
performance of the proposed optimal approach. The entries of
the channel vectors are all generated as independent circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variables with
zero-mean and unit variance. To guarantee secure communi-
cation, we set the probability κ = 0.99. For simplicity, we
assume that the interference thresholds at the PUs are equal,
i.e., Im = I for all m, and the number of Eves is fixed to
K = 3. The resulting power constraint for each antenna is
Pn = P/N for all n, where P is the total transmit power at the
ST. We also compare the performance of the proposed scheme
with existing schemes, namely, the “Isotropic JN scheme” [9],
[22] and “No JN scheme” [5]. In the “Isotropic JN scheme,”
the covariance matrix of the jamming beamforming is chosen
as U = puV¯V¯
H
N−1 where the variable pu is used to control
interference to the PUs and Eves. In the “No JN scheme,” the
optimization problem with no JN is considered as a benchmark
where the optimal solution can be obtained from (47) by
setting U to 0. The results obtained from (47) are referred
to as the “Optimal JN scheme.” The results of the average
secrecy rate are shown by averaging over 1,000 simulation
trials.
Fig. 2 depicts the typical convergence behavior of the
proposed Algorithm 1 where the network parameters are given
in the caption. Particularly, we plot the typical convergence
behavior of the proposed barrier method as a function of the
number of transmit antennas at the ST in Fig. 2(a), and a
function of the number of PUs in Fig. 2(b). The initial values
for the primal and dual variables in Algorithm 1 are randomly
generated. It is observed that Algorithm 1 exhibits a fast
convergence rate, which is slightly sensitive to the network
configurations.
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(a) Convergence behavior of the proposed Algorithm 1 for different number
of transmit antennas at the ST. The number of PUs is M = 1.
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(b) Convergence behavior of the proposed Algorithm 1 for different number
of PUs. The number of transmit antennas at the ST is N = 5.
Fig. 2. Convergence behavior of the proposed Algorithm 1, (a) for different
number of transmit antennas at the ST, and (b) for different number of
PUs. Each curve is obtained for one channel realization. The parameters of
Algorithm 1 are as follows. The tolerance is set to  = 10−5. The barrier
parameters ` and t0 are set to 1 and 50, respectively. The backtracking line
search parameters in Algorithm 1 are set as α = 0.01 and β = 0.5. In this
example, we set the network parameters as P = 10 dB and I = 1 dB.
Fig. 3 shows the convergence rate of the proposed Algo-
rithm 2. We also compare the convergence rate of the proposed
algorithm with the damped Newton method. The damped
Newton method can easily be applied to solve the considered
problem following similar steps as in [33, Section 9.5.2] which
also shows a fast convergence. The initial value of Γtol is set
to 0 dB. As seen, the duality gap of the Algorithm 2 drops
fast to minimum when the number of iterations increases,
and shows a faster convergence than that of the damped
Newton method algorithm. This is mainly due to the fact that
the BFGS algorithm approximates the inverse of the Hessian
matrix by using rank-one updates [36], which means that the
Hessian matrix is not computed directly. We recall that this
result significantly reduces the complexity of the considered
problem since the major computational complexity comes
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Fig. 3. Convergence behavior of the proposed Algorithm 2. Each curve is
obtained for one channel realization. The tolerance ´ is set to 10−5. The
network configuration is N = 5, M = 3, P = 10 dB, and I = 1 dB.
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Fig. 4. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system versus the total transmit
power at the ST. In this example, we set the network parameters as I = 5
dB, N = 5, and M = 3.
from Algorithm 1.
Fig. 4 illustrates the average secrecy rate of the secondary
system versus the transmit power at the ST. As seen, the
curves coincide in low power regime. The reason is that in
such a case, the ST mainly focuses on maximizing the secrecy
rate, as the interference constraints are likely satisfied for all
PUs. This indicates that JN may not be necessary in this
regime. However, in high power regime, the schemes using JN
outperform the scheme with no JN in terms of the secrecy rate.
In addition, for the “Optimal JN scheme,” the ST is allowed
to transmit with nearly full power, whereas the performance
of the “Isotropic JN scheme” and “No JN scheme” tends to
saturate. This is because the “Optimal JN scheme” controls the
interference to the PUs more efficiently than the other schemes
thanks to the optimized transmission.
The average secrecy rate of the secondary system is plotted
versus the number of antennas at the ST and the number
of PUs in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), respectively. From Fig.
5(a), it can be observed that the average secrecy rate of the
“Isotropic JN scheme” increases with N and approaches that
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(b) Average secrecy rate of the secondary system for different number of
PUs. The number of transmit antennas at the ST is N = 5.
Fig. 5. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system, (a) for different number
of transmit antennas at the ST, and (b) for different number of PUs. The
network parameters are set to P = 10 dB and I = 5 dB.
of the “No JN scheme” for large N . This means that for
the “Isotropic JN scheme,” we need little or no JN when N
is sufficiently large. The “Optimal scheme” still achieves a
better performance than the other schemes in all the range of
N . As expected, the average secrecy rate is improved as the
number of transmit antennas increases in all schemes, since
more degrees of freedom are added to the ST. From Fig. 5(b),
the performance of the three schemes degrades significantly
when the number of PUs increases. The reason is that when
the transmit power becomes sufficiently large, the ST needs
to avoid transmitting its signals over the spatial space of PUs.
Therefore, the degrees of freedom left for the ST are reduced
when the number of PUs increases.
In this numerical example, we plot the average secrecy
rate of the secondary system for the “Optimal JN scheme”
under several different assumptions of sharing equally the
resources, i.e., transmit power at the ST and interference
thresholds at the PUs. In particular, for total transmit power
at the ST, the information and JN beamforming are assumed
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Fig. 6. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system versus the total transmit
power at the ST, P , for different interference thresholds at the PUs, I (I =
Im,m = 1, 2, · · · ,M ). The network conguration is N = 5 and M = 3.
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Fig. 7. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system versus the total transmit
power at the ST, P , for different number of PUs, M . We set the network
parameters as N = 5 and I = 5 dB.
to share 50% of the power resource, i.e., [W]n,n ≤ Pn/2 and
[V¯U¯V¯H ]n,n ≤ Pn/2, which is referred to as equal transmit
power (ETP). Likewise, the information and JN beamforming
are assumed to share 50% of the interference threshold, i.e.,
tr(FmW) ≤ Im/2 and tr(F¯mU¯) ≤ Im/2, which is referred
to as equal interference threshold (EIT). Consequently, we
compare the performance of the proposed design with three
other suboptimal methods, namely ETP, EIT, and EIT-ETP, and
we present the results in Fig. 6. A general observation is that
the joint optimization design outperforms the other designs in
terms of the secrecy rate of the secondary system, especially
when compared to the ETP design. In addition, decreasing
the interference threshold I significantly degrades the secrecy
rate of the secondary system. The performance gain achieved
for higher interference threshold is due to the fact that more
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Fig. 8. Average sum rate of the primary system versus average secrecy rate
of the secondary system. For both systems, the network parameters are set to
N˜ = N = 5, P˜ = P = 15 dB, and M = 3.
transmit power can be used when the interference threshold
constraints are set to be high. Interestingly, the secrecy rate
of the EIT design approaches the optimal one when the
interference threshold is relatively small.
According to Remark 4, we now investigate the effect of two
different types of power constraints on the performance of the
secondary system, i.e., SPC and PAPCs. As can be seen from
Fig. 7, the secondary system achieves a better performance
by using the SPC than the PAPCs. The gaps between the two
types of power constraints are negligible for a large M and
high transmit power at the ST, P . We recall that for large
M and high P , the secondary system lacks the degrees of
freedom to leverage multiuser diversity.
Finally, the interference from the ST to a PU is consid-
ered in several schemes. Thus, it is interesting to investigate
how different schemes of interference constraints affect the
performance of the primary system. In particular, we consider
a primary system where the primary transmitter is equipped
with N˜ antennas and adopt zero-forcing beamforming with
PAPCs [29]. The interference from the ST is basically treated
as background thermal noise at the PUs. The total transmit
power at the primary transmitter is limited by P˜ . For this
setup, the average achieved sum rate of the primary system is
considered as a performance metric to evaluate the effective-
ness of each scheme. As can be seen from Fig. 8, the primary
system achieves a higher sum rate with the “Optimal scheme”
than with the other schemes. The gap between the schemes
diminishes for a lower sum rate of the primary system. This
is because in such a case, the interference at the PUs is higher,
and thus the “Isotropic JN scheme” and “No JN scheme”
can manage the interference more effectively. Interestingly, the
proposed optimal solution is quite robust even when the sum
rate of the primary system is high, whereas the secrecy rate of
the “Isotropic JN scheme” and “No JN scheme” drop to zero.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the secrecy rate maximization problem of MISO
CRN in the presence of multiple passive eavesdroppers and
primary users. The problem design is subject to per-antenna
power constraints at the secondary transmitter and interfer-
ence constraints at the PUs. By assuming the eavesdroppers’
channel i.i.d. Rayleigh fading, we first convert a nonconvex
constraint to a linear matrix inequality convex constraint. For
an optimal beamforming design, we transformed the problem
of secrecy rate maximization into that of finding a saddle point
of a minimax program where a rank relaxation method is
shown to be tight. We further developed a computationally
efficient algorithm based on a barrier method to find the
optimal solution of the mimimax problem. For the global op-
timal solution, the BFGS algorithm was employed to solve an
unconstrained optimization problem based on a dual problem.
Numerical results illustrated the superior convergence behavior
of the proposed algorithm, which is robust to the problem
size. Through numerical examples, we evaluated the tradeoff
between the secrecy rate of the secondary system and the sum
rate of the primary system. We concluded that the proposed
approach offers a better performance and is quite robust when
compared to the existing approaches [5], [9], [22].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The probability in (10b) for the k-th Eve link can be
rewritten as
Pr
(
tr
(
Gk
(
W − ΓtolV¯U¯V¯H
))≤ Γtol). (57)
Let Q , W−ΓtolV¯U¯V¯H . The probability in (57) cannot be
computed directly unless specific properties of Q are satisfied.
For N × N Hermitian matrices Gk and Q, the following
inequality holds [32]
tr(GkQ) ≤
N∑
i=1
λi(Gk)λi(Q)
(a)
= λmax(Gk)λmax(Q)
(b)
= tr(Gk)λmax(Q)
(58)
where λi(X) denotes the i-th eigenvalue of matrix X ∈
HN×N and its orders are arranged as λmax(X) = λ1(X) ≥
λ2(X) ≥ · · · ≥ λN (X) = λmin(X). In addition, the equalities
(a) and (b) in (58) are obtained because Gk is a rank-one
positive semidefinite matrix. Substituting (58) into (57), we
have
Pr
(
tr
(
Gk
(
W − ΓtolV¯U¯V¯H
))≤ Γtol)
≥ Pr
(
tr(Gk)λmax(Q) ≤ Γtol
)
. (59)
Since the channel gk, ∀k, is modeled as i.i.d. Rayleigh fading,
we have
Pr
(
max
k∈K
tr(GkW)
tr(GkV¯U¯V¯H) + 1
≤ Γtol
)
≥ Pr
(
tr(G)λmax(Q) ≤ Γtol
)
≥ κ1/K
⇔ Pr
(λmax(Q)
Γtol
≥ 1
tr(G)
)
≤ 1− κ1/K
(c)⇔ λmax(Q) ≤ Φ−1N (1− κ1/K)Γtol
⇔ Q  I
(
Φ−1N (1− κ1/K)Γtol
)
(60)
13
where without loss of generality, we have removed the index
of Eves and (c) is obtained similarly to the steps of Lemma
2 in [23]. Φ−1N (·) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution
function of an inverse central chi-square random variable with
2N degrees of freedom, and tr(G) = tr(|g|2) is the sum of
the squares of N independent Gaussian random variables. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
In this appendix, we prove that the rank of the optimal
solution W? to (12) is less than or equal to one. The
Lagrangian of the relaxed version of (12) can be defined with
respect to W as
L(W,D, {λn}, {µm},Λw) = log(1 + hHWh)− tr(DW)
−
N∑
n=1
λntr(WB
(n))−
M∑
m=1
µmtr(FmW) + tr(WΛw) + Ω
(61)
where B(n) , THT, T = [0Tn−1 1 0TN−n], Fm , fmfHm ,
and Ω denotes the summation of terms that only involve
variables not related to the structure of W?. {λn ≥ 0} and
{µm ≥ 0} are the Lagrange multipliers of P.6 associated
with the constraints (12c) and (12d), respectively. The matrices
D  0 and Λw  0 are the Lagrange multiplier matrices as-
sociated with the constraint (12b) and the positive semidefinite
matrix constraint W  0, respectively.
Let Σ , D + B¯ +
∑M
m=1 µmFm, where B¯ = diag(λ) and
λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ]
T . Then (61) can be rewritten as
L(W,Σ,Λw) = log(1 + hHWh)− tr(ΣW)
+ tr(WΛw) + Ω. (62)
The optimality conditions for (62) are directly related to W?,
which should satisfy the necessary conditions for optimality
[33]
hhH
1 + hHW?h
−Σ? + Λ?w = 0
Λ?wW
? = 0
W?  0.
(63)
By multiplying the first equation in (63) with W? and applying
the result to the second equation in (63), we get
hhH
1 + hHW?h
W? = Σ?W?. (64)
Since Σ? is invertible,2 rank(Σ?) = N . In addition,
rank(hhH) ≤ 1, and it follows from (64) that rank(W?) ≤ 1.
Lemma 2 is thus proved.
2We remark that {λn}, or D and {µm} must be positive. This is because
the total power at the ST should be used up or the interference constraints
should be met at optimum, i.e., {λ?n} > 0, or D?  0 and {µ?m} > 0. In
other words, the inequality constraint in (12c), or (12b) and (12d) hold with
equality at optimality.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here, we prove that P7 is the dual problem of the relaxed
problem of P6. In particular, we follow the same steps as in
[29] while customizing them to our considered problem. The
partial Lagrangian function of the relaxed version of P6 can
be defined as
L(W, U¯,D, {λn}, {µm}) = log(1 + hHWh)
−tr(D(W − ΓtolV¯U¯V¯H − Iξ))
−
N∑
n=1
λn
(
tr(WB(n)) + tr(U¯E(n))− Pn
)
−
M∑
m=1
µm
(
tr(FmW) + tr(F¯mU¯)− Im
)
(65)
where E(n) , T¯HT¯, T¯ = [0Tn−1 1 0TN−n]V¯, and F¯m ,
f¯mf¯
H
m . Next, the dual objective of P6 is given by
D(D, {λn}, {µm}) = max
W,U¯0
L(W, U¯,D, {λn}, {µm}).
(66)
For a given set (D, {λn}, {µm}), we first rewrite the partial
Lagrangian function as
L(W, U¯,D,λ,µ) = log(1 + hHWh)− tr(ΣW)
−tr(ΩU¯) + ξtr(D) + p¯Tλ+ I¯Tµ (67)
where Ω , −ΓtolV¯HDV¯+
∑N
n=1 λnE
(n)+
∑M
m=1 µmF¯m =
V¯H
(
−ΓtolD + diag(λ) +
∑M
m=1 µmFm
)
V¯,
p¯ = [P1, P2, · · · , PN ]T , λ = [λ1, λ2, · · · , λN ]T ,
I¯ = [I1, I2, · · · , IM ]T , and µ = [µ1, µ2, · · · , µM ]T .
Let W¯ = Σ1/2WΣ1/2. Since Σ is invertible, (67) can be
rewritten as
L(W¯, U¯,D,λ,µ) = log(1 + hHΣ−1/2W¯Σ−1/2h)
−tr(W¯)− tr(ΩU¯) + ξtr(D) + p¯Tλ+ I¯Tµ. (68)
Based on the results in [28, Appendix A], the dual objective
in (66) is equivalent to
D(D,λ,µ) = max
w≥0,U¯0
log |I + Σ−1/2hwhHΣ−1/2|
−w − tr(ΩU¯) + ξtr(D) + p¯Tλ+ I¯Tµ (69)
where the relationship between W¯ and w is given by
W¯ =
Σ−1/2hwhHΣ−1/2
hHΣ−1h
. (70)
Next, we can write D(D,λ,µ) in a more compact form as
D(D,ψ) = max
w≥0,U¯0
log |I + Σ−1/2hwhHΣ−1/2|
− w − tr(ΩU¯) + ξtr(D) + pTψ
= max
w≥0,U¯0
log
|Σ + hwhH |
|Σ|
− w − tr(ΩU¯) + ξtr(D) + pTψ
(71)
where p = [p¯T I¯T ]T and ψ = [λT µT ]T .
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The dual problem is obtained by minimizing D(D,ψ) as
min
ψ≥0,D0
D(D,ψ). (72)
or equivalently as
min
ψ≥0,D0
max
w≥0,U¯0
log |Σ+hwh
H |
|Σ| − w − tr(ΩU¯)
+ ξtr(D) + pTψ.
(73)
To obtain an optimal point for the minimax problem in (73),
we introduce another optimization variable ϕ ≥ 0. Then, (73)
can be rewritten as
min
ψ≥0,D0
max
ϕ≥0,w≥0,U¯0
log |Σ+hwh
H |
|Σ| − ϕP
+ξtr(D) + pTψ
s. t. w + tr(ΩU¯) ≤ ϕP.
(74)
It is easy to see that (74) is equivalent to (73) since the
inequality must hold with equality at optimality; otherwise,
we can scale down ϕ to achieve a strictly larger objective.
Next we make a change of variables as
w˜ = w/ϕ, ψ˜ = ψ/ϕ, D˜ = D/ϕ, U˜ = U¯/ϕ. (75)
We now consider w˜, ψ˜, D˜, and U˜ as the new optimization
variables. Then, (74) can be equivalently expressed as
min
ψ˜≥0, D˜0
max
ϕ≥0,w˜≥0,U˜0
log |Σ˜+hw˜h
H |
|Σ˜|
+ ϕ(ξtr(D˜) + pT ψ˜ − P )
s. t. w˜ + tr(ΩU˜) ≤ P
(76)
where Σ˜ = Σ/ϕ. It is easy to see that the optimal dual
variable ϕ? can be obtained by considering the minimization
of (76) over ψ˜ and D˜. Hence, (76) is the dual of the following
problem:
min
ψ˜≥0, D˜0
max
ϕ≥0,w˜≥0,U˜0
log |Σ+hw˜h
H |
|Σ|
s. t. w˜ + tr(ΩU˜) ≤ P
ξtr(D˜) + pT ψ˜ ≤ P.
(77)
Finally, from the derivations in (70), (75), (77) and W =
Σ−1/2W¯Σ−1/2k , the proof is finalized.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The dual objective of (49) is
g(υ) = inf
Γtol
L(Γtol,υ) = −ρTυ + inf
Γtol
(
h˜(Γtol) + υ
TaΓtol
)
= −ρTυ − sup
Γtol
(
(−aTυ)TΓtol − h˜(Γtol)
)
= −ρTυ − h˜∗(−aTυ) (78)
where h˜∗(·) is the convex conjugate of h˜(·).
For the convex conjugate h˜∗(−aTυ), we use the Legendre
Transform to a log function as: − log(x)→ −(1 + log(−x∗))
[38]. Thus, the dual problem is
g(υ) = −ρTυ − 1− log(−aTυ) (79)
and the proof is completed.
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